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Scott Pruitt unfiltered: EPA administrator talks climate science, car emissions

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Scott Pruitt gave Reuters a wide-ranging interview on Monday at his office in Washington, discussing issues from climate science to automobile emissions. The following is a full transcript of the interview: REUTERS: You have said the EPA will focus on a "Back to Basics" approach under your leadership. What does this mean for how EPA enforces polluters? You have been critical of the idea of regulation by enforcement. PRUITT: I think what I'm speaking about, there is a consent decree approach to enforcement, where you use judicial proceedings to actually engage in regulation. Enforcement should be about existing regulations that you're actually enforcing against someone who may be violating that, very much in the prosecutorial manner. As attorney general [in Oklahoma], I lived that. There was a grand jury that I led. Being a prosecutor, I understand very much the importance of prioritization, of enforcing the rule of law, of addressing bad actors. That's something we are going to do in a meaningful way across the broad spectrum of cases, whether it is in the office of air or the Superfund area, or otherwise. REUTERS: Do you want to see states play a bigger role in enforcing polluters, even though some have less of a capacity to do so – financially and personnel wise? PRUITT: I think the state's role is really, when you look at this office working with states, it should be how do we assist, how do we engage in compliance and assistance with states. The office [at EPA that deals with enforcement] is called OECA, the Office of Enforcement, Compliance and Assistance, so those are the tools we have in the toolbox to achieve better outcomes. So what we ought to be doing is working proactively with state DEQs [Departments of Environmental Quality] to get their state implementation plans [for federal regulations] timely submitted, provide assistance and technical support, drive a draft of state implementation plans, and then actually work with them on how to achieve through those plans better outcomes and air and water quality. As far as enforcement is concerned, we will actually work with states. We actually did that recently with Colorado. There was an oil and gas company that was emitting some 3,000 tons, is that what it was, it was quite a bit of ... it was an ozone case. In any event, we joined with Colorado in that prosecution. So sometimes states will do it, sometimes we will join with them.

The VW emissions carnage assessment with an upside

Bombs cause destruction. Even if they're intelligently guided and pinpoint, there's always collateral damage. The strange Volkswagen brew, which is still spontaneously combusting in plain sight, will result in aftershocks for years. And the professional end of the corporation's top leadership will not be the only casualties. Blows are striking shareholder confidence, the residual value of the cars involved, consumer confidence, and the German economy itself. A hard rain's going to fall elsewhere, too. Here are just four damage assessment areas. The High-Compression Past and Low-Compassion Future of Diesels Despite European and especially German manufacturers' high belief that diesel engines were a way to light-duty automotive salvation, VW's scandal started the last nail in the fuel's coffin. Regulations both in the U.S. and in Europe for particulates and nitrogen oxide (NOx) are getting much harder to meet, and this is at the very core of VW's deception. Even with the high-cost exhaust after-treatment systems, sky-high fuel pressure, and sophisticated electronics, the inescapable NOx realities won't be washable by technology in an affordable way. German engineering pride will have to work a real miracle to meet these looming regs and the stain of VW's scandal did the whole diesel movement no favors. Perhaps not so ironically, the E.U. adopted more stringent emission standards this year, which closely mimic the U.S. Tier 2, Bin 5 figures phased in for 2008. Indeed, when VW announced it was able to meet the stringent US NOx emissions standards in 2009 for its diesel engines without urea injection as an exhaust after-treatment, it was a particularly high point of engineering pride for the company. No other manufacturer had figured out how to do so. One Honda official at the time remarked that they had simply no idea how VW was achieving this feat and Honda couldn't come close. Well, neither could VW. On a macro scale, European cities are also starting to face government fines for air quality violations. This is forcing those cities to find various ways to cut smog-related causes like tailpipe emissions. In fact, Paris has gone to the length of restricting car use on a sliding scale when smog persists, while electric cars are free to roam. France's longer and larger plan is banning diesel fuel for light-duty transportation entirely. But why was there a frothy focus by the European manufacturers on diesels in the first place?

VW fix would have cost $335 per vehicle

Since the Volkswagen diesel kerfuffle began, Bosch, the world's largest auto supplier, has been hooked up to a bullhorn trying to make sure everyone knows its side of the story. Bosch supplied VW with the engine management testing software, including delivery and metering modules, that VW then used to skirt emissions laws in the US. Bosch told VW in 2007 that it was illegal to use the software in cars it planned to sell yet VW did it anyway, according to reports coming out in German newspapers Bild am Sonntag and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. That first warning came two years after VW started developing the small-displacement diesel, around the time that the two men pushing its development, then-brand chief Wolfgang Bernhard and engineer Rudolf Krebs, were telling their superiors that the engine needed AdBlue urea injection to pass US emissions. VW cost controllers wouldn't approve the AdBlue solution because it would add 300 euros ($335 US) to the cost of the vehicle. Bernhard and Krebs left the same year that Bosch advised VW about the software, two years before the engine went into production. That's when things get cloudy. A report in Automotive News says that when Martin Winterkorn took over in 2007 as head of the VW Group and brand, he asked Ulrich Hackenberg and Wolfgang Hatz to keep working on the engine, and "[the] engine then ended up in VW Group diesels" with that problematic software still intact. No one has yet pointed any fingers at this latter chain of command, but like a game of Clue, right now they're the professors in the library holding the candlesticks. Warnings didn't only come from the supplier: Frankfurter says VW's initial investigation has found that an engineer issued the same caution to the company in 2011. Neither Bosch nor VW would comment on the reports.