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VW fix would have cost $335 per vehicle

Since the Volkswagen diesel kerfuffle began, Bosch, the world's largest auto supplier, has been hooked up to a bullhorn trying to make sure everyone knows its side of the story. Bosch supplied VW with the engine management testing software, including delivery and metering modules, that VW then used to skirt emissions laws in the US. Bosch told VW in 2007 that it was illegal to use the software in cars it planned to sell yet VW did it anyway, according to reports coming out in German newspapers Bild am Sonntag and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. That first warning came two years after VW started developing the small-displacement diesel, around the time that the two men pushing its development, then-brand chief Wolfgang Bernhard and engineer Rudolf Krebs, were telling their superiors that the engine needed AdBlue urea injection to pass US emissions. VW cost controllers wouldn't approve the AdBlue solution because it would add 300 euros ($335 US) to the cost of the vehicle. Bernhard and Krebs left the same year that Bosch advised VW about the software, two years before the engine went into production. That's when things get cloudy. A report in Automotive News says that when Martin Winterkorn took over in 2007 as head of the VW Group and brand, he asked Ulrich Hackenberg and Wolfgang Hatz to keep working on the engine, and "[the] engine then ended up in VW Group diesels" with that problematic software still intact. No one has yet pointed any fingers at this latter chain of command, but like a game of Clue, right now they're the professors in the library holding the candlesticks. Warnings didn't only come from the supplier: Frankfurter says VW's initial investigation has found that an engineer issued the same caution to the company in 2011. Neither Bosch nor VW would comment on the reports.

Winterkorn kept diesel scandal secret, letter claims

Former Volkswagen Group CEO Martin Winterkorn allegedly kept quiet for two weeks about emissions defeat devices in the company's models. US officials eventually made the automaker's deception public on September 18th. "In the conversation on 03.09.2015 with the regulator CARB (California Air Resources Board), the defeat device was admitted," an employee told Winterkorn on September 4, according to Reuters citing Germany's Bild am Sonntag. Based on this information, Winterkorn had plenty of time to admit the problem. Evidence like this letter continues to suggest top figures knew about the emissions problem. In addition, a separate Bild am Sonntag report recently claimed that an employee emailed Winterkorn in May 2014 to tell him US regulators could discover the cheating. In the lower echelons of the company, the deception was allegedly an open secret among engineers as early as 2006, and people kept quiet even after workers tried to admit what was happening. This culture of secrecy seems to go even deeper than just the diesel emissions scandal. For example, engineers admitted that they cheated on CO2 tests to meet the company's strict standards. According to Green Car Reports, these problems also affected the US. In 2004, an Audi worker in America allegedly discovered an issue with the exhaust gas temperature sensor in some vehicles, but a German executive said not to admit the problem to US regulators. It's not clear whether any high level employees tried to fix the diesel emissions issue or if they simply kept the problem hidden. The company's internal report, which is due in the latter half of April, might address that concern. So far, the VW Group has said only a small group of people caused the scandal. However, these many allegations to the contrary make that claim difficult to believe. Related Video:

In wake of Volkswagen scandal, cheating may actually get easier

The three crises that rollicked the auto industry in recent months – a rising death toll related to the General Motors ignition-switch defect, the Jeep Cherokee hack and now the Volkswagen cheating scandal – all have one thing in common. Outsiders discovered the problems. In the new matter of Volkswagen rigging millions of cars to outsmart emissions tests, researchers at West Virginia University and the International Council on Clean Transportation first spotted irregularities. In the hacking of a Jeep Cherokee, it was independent cyber-security researchers Chris Valasek and Charlie Miller who found and reported cellular vulnerabilities that allowed them to control a car from halfway across the country. And lest we forget in the case of General Motors, it was a Mississippi mechanic and Florida engineer who first made connections between non-deploying airbags and faulty GM ignition switches that had been altered over time. They worked on behalf of Brooke Melton, a 29-year-old Georgia woman killed in a Chevy Cobalt. "That argument is built on a whole string of trusts, and now it is clear that we should absolutely not be trusting." - Kyle Wiens Amid the Volkswagen scandal, the role these independent third parties played in unearthing life-threatening problems is important to highlight, not only because it shines a light on the ethical indifference corporations paid to life-and-death problems of their creation. The role of the independents is noteworthy because, just as their contributions never been more relevant in protecting the driving public, they could soon be barred from the automotive landscape. Since May, a little-known but critically important process has been playing out before an office within the Library of Congress, which will soon decide whether independent researchers and mechanics can continue to access vehicle software or whether that software, which runs dozens of vehicle components, is protected by copyright law. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act criminalizes measures taken to circumvent security devices that protect copyrighted works. When the DMCA was signed into law in 1998, it was intended to protect the likes of movies from being pirated and companies from ripping off software. At the time, few had a clue that some 17 years later cars would essentially be mobile software platforms run by millions of lines of code that potentially fall under the law's jurisdiction.